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Abstract
In the last decade a number of Internet-based multi-sided platforms have emerged that
provide free services to, in some cases, millions of businesses. More such platforms are
being spawned as the Internet-based economy grows. This Article argues that under current
norms in adversarial proceedings, such as those involving competition policy, these
platforms are likely to face large numbers of complaints in multiple jurisdictions, a
substantial likelihood that at least one of these complaints will result in a false-positive
decision against the platform, and material risk of a false-positive decision that results in
catastrophic consequences. These effects result from a combination of business users of
free services receiving a free litigation option they can pursue if they have any complaints;
an adverse-selection problem that results from free services being particularly attractive to
start-ups that do not have or want to invest capital in their businesses; and the sheer number
of free-business users resulting in a high cumulative probability of at least one falsepositive decision. After documenting these phenomena, this Article argues that government
policymakers, including competition authorities and courts, should adopt a heightened level
of scrutiny concerning complaints from free business users. This heightened level of
scrutiny is necessary to counteract the impact of excessive litigation on innovation by
multi-sided platforms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades many multi-sided platforms have emerged
that provide free services to large numbers of businesses worldwide. These
include the Apple and Android mobile operating systems; the Google,
Baidu, Yahoo, and Bing search engines; the Facebook, Twitter, and
Google+ social networks; and the PayPal X payments software
development platform. The number of businesses that receive free services
from these platforms range from the thousands in the case of PayPal to the
tens of millions in the case of Google.
More than 37 million businesses, public figures, brands, and charities
had, for example, Facebook fan pages with 10 or more fans at the end of
2011.1 Companies use these pages to communicate with their fans and
attract new ones. McDonald’s, for example, had more than 12 million fans
as of the beginning of 2012.2 Facebook does not charge these entities for
having fan pages.
Businesses that receive free services sometimes object when the
platform takes actions that these businesses perceive reduce the value of the
free services to them. In some cases their ire has resulted in private
litigation, complaints to competition authorities, lobbying for government
investigations, and advocating regulation of the platform. A common
complaint by business users is that the platform has violated various
competition laws. Baidu, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter have,
for example, all faced complaints by business users of their free-platform
services that allege these platforms violated the competition laws3 of the
various jurisdictions.4
1

Facebook Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 75 (Feb. 1, 2012).
Fans could, among other things, go to McDonald’s fan page and play “The Quest for
the Golden McRib.” That was one of the ways the hamburger chain used its fan page to
engage people and promote its products. McDonald’s Facebook page,
http://www.facebook.com/McDonalds (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
3
In addition to laws against monopolization (Section 2 of the U.S. Sherman Act) and
abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU), competition laws for the purpose of this article
include unfair competition, and deceptive practices, such as under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), Ch. 311, §5, 38 Stat. 719, codified at 15 U.S.C. §45(a),
various US state laws such as the California Unfair Competition Law, laws of various EU
Member States concerning unfair competitive practices, and similar laws in other
jurisdictions.
4
The following cases involve allegations by business users of free multi-sided
platform services that the platform violated the competition laws, often as well as other
laws, of one or more jurisdictions. See, e.g., Opinion by Beijing No. 1 Intermediate
2
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The volume of complaints over free platform services is likely to
increase. The number of businesses that use existing free platform services
is growing. For example, the number of smart phone applications for the
iPhone and Android software platforms increased by about 75 percent
between 2010 and 2011.5 Around 28 percent of iPhone Apps and 57
percent6 of Android applications do not generate any revenue for the
platform.7 More multi-sided platforms are likely to start as a result of the
People’s Court, Civil Case No. Yizhongminchuzi 845/2009 [Renren v. Baidu]; Case T‑
201/04 R, Microsoft v. Comm’n, [2004] E.C.R. II‑4463 (alleging Baidu reduced Renren’s
website search rankings in violation of the Chinese Anti Monopoly Laws);
KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (N.D. Ca. Mar. 16, 2007)
(alleging Google reduced Kinderstart’s website search rankings in violation of Section 2 of
Sherman Act); Complaint, Sambreel Holdings LLC vs. Facebook, Inc., No. 12 CV 0668 W
KSC (S.D. California, March 19, 2012) (alleging Facebook sought to reduce user and
advertiser use of the Sambreel’s Yontoo Platform in violation of U.S. and California
competition laws). See also Jhon Ribeiro, Facebook Faces Antitrust Suit From
Advertisement-Sponsored Skins Developer, PCWORLD (Mar. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/252189/facebook_faces_antitrust_suit_fro
m_advertisementsponsored_skins_developer.html; Aldridge v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F.
Supp. 728 (S.D. Texas, 1998); Aldridge v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Texas,
1998). Jeff Bliss & Brian Womack, FTC Begins Twitter Antitrust Inquiry, BLOOMBERG
(July 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-01/ftc-said-to-have-begunantitrust-inquiry-into-twitter-s-developer-policies.html (concerning FTC investigation over
Twitter’s policies toward developers).
5
From about 330,000 in 2010 to about 575,000 in 2011. Dean Takahashi, Apple’s App
Store crosses 300,000 apps, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 16, 2010),
http://venturebeat.com/2010/10/16/apples-app-store-crosses-300000-apps.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2012); Robin Wauters, Google: Android Market now serving 30,000 apps,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 16, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/16/google-android-marketnow-serving-30000-apps.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012); Stan Schroeder, Apple’s
500,000 Approved iOS Apps by the Numbers, MASHABLE (May 24, 2011),
http://mashable.com/2011/05/24/app-store-500000-apps (last visited Mar. 13, 2012); David
Goldman, Taking down the Apple and Google smartphone duopoly, CNNMONEY (Mar. 10,
2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/09/technology/wac_wholesale_applications/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 16, 2012). The numbers are estimates as Apple and Android do not
make the number of apps publically available. See Robin Wauters, Google: Android
Market now serving 30,000 apps, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/16/google-android-market-now-serving-30000-apps.html
(last visited Mar. 16, 2012); Brennon Slattery, App Overload: Apple Passes 300k Apps ,
PCWORLD (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/208070/app_overload_apple_passes_300k_apps.html (last
visited Mar. 13, 2012).
6
Robin Wauters, Distimo: 57% of Andriod Apps Are Free Vs. 28% of iPhone Apps,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 21, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2010/07/05/distimo-june-2010/
(last visited April 2, 2012).
7
Apple and Google charge developers a commission for sales of paid applications
through their respective stores. See iOS Developer Program: Program Enrollment,
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spread of broadband, the rise of cloud computing, and advances in other
technologies. Some of these will provide free platform services to
businesses. The global reach of the leading platforms means that the
complaints by business users will occur in many jurisdictions around the
world; that in turn will result in uncoordinated and differing approaches by
these regulators and ensuring uncertainty which could depress investment in
these platforms.
It is ironic that giving services away could lead to so much contention.
But it is not surprising. Several of these platforms have large shares in the
categories of service they provide in many countries. Those metrics provide
a starting point for complainants to argue that these platforms are dominant
firms with significant market power.8 These platforms also provide business
users with access to customers thereby making it possible for complainants
to argue that these platforms are essential facilities or should be treated
under a common carrier standard and subjected to regulation.9 Multi-sided
platforms, and the businesses that use them, sometimes offer services that
have ostensible similarities so that complainants can argue that the effect,
and the motive, for the changes in business practices is to exclude
competitors and thereby monopolize a market.10
Some or all of these claims could be true in particular circumstances.
This Article argues, however, that successful multi-sided platforms that
provide free business services are subject to “excessive litigation”11 that can
https://developer.apple.com/support/ios/enrollment.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2012);
Android Market for Developer: Transaction Fees,
https://support.google.com/androidmarket/developer/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=11262
2 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
8
See, e.g., Consumer Watchdog Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and
Other Relief, In the matter of Facebook, Inc. and Facebook Credits (Jun. 28, 2011),
available
at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/cwd_ftc_facebook_credits_complaint-3.pdf,
at 2 (“Facebook is the largest and by far the dominant social network on the planet.
Approximately half of the U.S. population actively uses Facebook. While Facebook has not
disclosed revenue data, it is estimated that Facebook controls well over 50% of the market
for virtual goods offered in social gaming. Thus, Facebook exercises monopoly power in
that market.”).
9
See Class Action Complaint at 19, KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 062057 JF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
10
For example, KinderStart, a site that curated content related to parenting, claimed
that it competed with Google in search. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 7,
KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
11
Excessive litigation means more litigation than is socially optimal. A socially
optimal legal system will result in “bad” complaints—ones that an all-knowing power
would recognize are not valid—simply because the legal system has imperfect information
and transactions costs. The problems identified here result in more bad complaints being
brought. If the legal authorities fail to account for these effects, there will be more false
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result in false-positive decisions as a result of three mutually reinforcing
phenomena.
The first phenomenon involves the litigation option. Businesses that use
platform services obtain an option to sue that platform or to advocate
policies that could impose significant costs on the platform.12 As the
platform becomes more successful there is an increasing chance that courts
or competition authorities would find that the platform is a dominant firm or
that legislators would find appealing arguments that the platform should be
regulated or otherwise restrained. Moreover, as the platform becomes more
successful the business user has a higher chance of obtaining damages, the
benefits of behavioral remedies imposed on the platform, or concessions
and money from the platform as part of a settlement. The value of the
litigation option therefore increases with the success of the platform.
The second phenomenon concerns large numbers. Several of the webbased multi-sided platforms attract millions of businesses. That is a
consequence of their global reach, the types of services they are offering,
and the attractiveness of free services. As the size of the affected population
increases, a larger number of businesses are likely to believe they have been
negatively affected by changes in platform policies concerning free services
and pursue litigation or other adversarial proceedings. Moreover, it only
takes one successful claimant to impose substantial costs on a multi-sided
platform. If a claimant can persuade a competition authority, for example,
to pursue a claim the platform could be subject to years of investigation and
distraction of management time. Each claimant can impose a low
probability of a catastrophic event such as a decision by a competition
authority or court to break up the firm or subject it to long-term oversight or
regulation. Multi-sided platforms can therefore face relatively high
probabilities of catastrophic events as these low probabilities are aggregated
across more potential claimants.
The third phenomenon is adverse selection. Free-platform services are,
all else equal, relatively more attractive to entrepreneurs that cannot secure
positives (that is, wrong findings of guilt), which would discourage investment in free
platform services and induce platforms to avoid improvements desired by users simply
because it might harm some firms’ business models. Previous papers have compared the
social and private incentives to sue, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private
Incentive To Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Leg. Stud. 333 (1982), and have
noted that private incentives may lead to too much or too little litigation. However,
Shavell’s model assumes that courts never make errors in assigning liability and that loss
prevention activities by the defendant are always socially desirable. In contrast, this article
examines factors specific to free platform services that lead to more bad complaints, and
stresses the danger that false positives can cause in such a context.
12
Buyers always have an option to sue for product liability, breach of contract, or
other legal theories. The difference here is that buyers are obtaining that option for free.
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funding. Investors are more likely to fund entrepreneurs that have better
prospects of success. As a result, platforms that provide free services will
tend to attract entrepreneurs that are relatively more vulnerable and
relatively more likely to fail. Free platform services are also relatively more
attractive to entrepreneurs who are less confident in their own prospects for
the same reasons. They have to put up less of their own money when they
rely on free platform services. They will tend to sort themselves into
businesses that involve less financial commitment. These entrepreneurs are
also more likely to fail assuming that their expectations on their prospects
are correct. As a result of adverse selection, the businesses that rely on free
platform services are more likely to encounter business problems. Some of
these businesses may seek to obtain compensation or beneficial changes in
the platform’s terms by pursuing a government intervention by, for
example, filing an antitrust complaint or threatening to do so.13
These three phenomena compound each other. Applied to a very large
population of businesses the use of the litigation option combined with the
adverse-selection problem can result, on average, in many opportunistic
complaints that consume management time, that result in a significant
likelihood of one or more false-positive decision against that platform, and
pose a material risk of a catastrophic decision.
Multi-sided platforms may engage in anticompetitive practices or unfair
business practices behavior just like any firm. Competition authorities, for
example, should therefore maintain vigilance over these firms given their
economic significance. The litigation option, adverse selection and large
number phenomena suggest, however, that public authorities should be
more skeptical of businesses whose complaints stem from using free
services provided by multi-sided platforms. In particular, it implies that
courts and competition authorities, for example, should impose a heightened
standard of review for these complaints in order to better balance false
positives and false negatives.
This heightened review is desirable because it reduces the negative
feedback effect between adversarial proceedings and business behavior. The
adverse selection and large number phenomena increase the likelihood that
offering free business services will result in a false positive decision by
governmental bodies with catastrophic consequences. At the margin, those
combined phenomena deter platforms from providing free business services
or making efficient changes in their free business services. Heightened
review helps reduce those negative incentives. It reduces the value of the
13

There are many reasons why well-funded highly able businesses may find it
profitable to use free platform services. The point here is that the offer of free platform
services will tend to attract entrepreneurs that lack funding and that these entrepreneurs
would be expected a priori, to have less successful businesses.
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option value of litigation and therefore reduces the incentives for
entrepreneurs to rely excessively on free platform services.
This Article explains these three phenomena and how they lead to
excessive litigation (or other government interventions) against multi-sided
platforms that provide free business services. It also proposes an approach
that competition authorities and courts could use for reducing the social
welfare losses from these phenomena. The principles behind this heightened
review could be applied in other settings including legislative
considerations of whether to impose common carrier regulation or
adversarial proceedings involving unfair business practices.
Section II summarizes the economic motivations for providing platform
services for free, or at a price that is less than the cost of providing them. In
most cases, the services are provided for free because they help attract other
platform participants that pay. Section II also documents that multi-sided
platforms provide free services to large numbers of businesses.
Section III describes two businesses that follow similar business models
but made diametrically opposed decisions on relying on free platform
services—in this cases search engines. It then examines how businesses
balance the benefits of using a free platform against the risks of the platform
changing the terms of the deal. It shows how this can result in an adverse
selection problem by which platforms attract entrepreneurs that have high
likelihoods of failure.
Section IV describes the litigation option, large number and adverse
selection phenomena in more detail. It shows how these phenomena work
together to make multi-sided platforms vulnerable to many complaints by
users of free business services.
Section V presents empirical support for the litigation option, large
number, and adverse-selection phenomena. It is based on an analysis of
companies that have complained that Google has violated the competition
laws by altering search rankings or the presentation of search results for
these companies.
Section VI considers the interaction between the adverse selection,
litigation option and large number phenomena on social welfare. It shows
that the combination of these three phenomena could impose significant
costs on the economy as a result of reduced innovation.
Section VII proposes imposing a heightened burden on businesses that
bring antitrust complaints stemming from their use of free business services.
The approach involves adjusting judgments on the merits of complaints
given the adverse selection, litigation option and large number problems
and using multiple objective criteria for fine-tuning decisions on procedure
and merit. While this Article focuses on antitrust complaints the heightened
review presented in that context could be applied in other adversarial
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settings as well.
Section VIII makes some concluding remarks.
II. MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS AND FREE SERVICES
A multi-sided platform provides a place for people and businesses to
find each other, engage in interactions, and exchange value.14 A shopping
mall operator, for example, provides a place for stores and shoppers to get
together and transact. After developing the mall, it rents out space to stores
and encourages shoppers to visit.15 Many other industries provide services
based on multi-sided platforms. Payment card networks such as American
Express provide platforms that enable merchants and cardholders to
transact. Media businesses such as The New York Times help connect
buyers (viewers) and sellers (advertisers). Software platforms such as the
Android OS help connect users, hardware markers, and applications
developers.16 Social networks typically provide a place for senders and
receivers of messages to interact; enable advertisers to present messages to
these senders and receivers; and make the social graph available to
application developers such as social game providers.17
Multi-sided platforms generate value by reducing transactions costs
between members of two or more groups that could benefit from getting
together. They do that by reducing the costs of finding trading partners,
increasing the quality of the matching between these partners, and lowering
the costs of exchange. A shopping mall does that by reducing the travel
costs for shoppers who can visit several stores in trip and reducing the cost
of obtaining customers for the retail stores that benefit from the aggregation
of customers. Sometimes the reduction in transactions costs results directly
14

See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of
Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 151 (W.
Dale Collins ed., 2008); Glen E. Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100(4)
AM. ECON. REV. 1642 (2010).
15
Shopping malls can be physical places such as Simon Properties’ Copley Place mall
in Boston or virtual places such as the Payvment mall on Facebook. Payvment provides
software that enables merchants to operate stores on their fan pages on Facebook. It then
makes these virtual stores available on the Payvment fan page on Facebook which then
operates as a virtual mall. See Shopping Mall by Payvment,
http://www.facebook.com/payvment?v=info (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
16
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 32 (Gerhard Illing &
Martin Peitz eds. 2006).
17
See, e.g., Facebook Developers, http://developers.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 22,
2012).
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or indirectly in the provision of new products and services. Software
platforms such as Windows have lead to the creation of innovative
applications while media properties such as CBS have spawned innovations
in entertainment for the purposes of attracting viewers.
The cost of creating a multi-sided platform has declined
substantially as a result of the information-technology revolution. The
expansion of the Internet, the increased deployment of broadband and
wireless, reductions in hardware costs, and advances in software technology
have lowered the cost of creating virtual platforms for connecting people
and businesses. It has also made it possible for web-based platforms to
expand globally very quickly.
Each distinct group served by a multi-sided platform is often called
a platform “side”. For instance, retailers and shoppers are the two “sides”
of the shopping mall platform. It is common for platforms to offer services
to members on one side for free or at prices that do not recover the direct
variable costs of providing these services as shown next.
A. Free Platform Services
Facebook provides many services for free. As of early 2012 there
were more than 800 million active users each month.18 These users had
access to web pages created by Facebook and a variety of tools that helped
them communicate with their friends on Facebook. The typical user has
about 130 friends19 and spends on average 7 hours and 46 minutes a
month20 on Facebook. They do not pay anything for these services. Most
major companies have set up fan pages21 for which they pay nothing.22
Facebook also operates a software development platform that enables
companies to develop applications that use the social graph.23 As of
January 2012 more than 7 million applications and websites were integrated
into Facebook.24 Facebook does not, as a general matter, charge developers
18

Facebook Newsroom, Company Info, Fact Sheet, Statistics,
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
19
See Friends & Frenemies: Why We Add and Remove Facebook Friends, NM Incite
(Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.nmincite.com/?p=6051(last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
20
August 2011 – Top US Web Brands, Nielsen Wire (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/august-2011-top-us-web-brands (last
visited Mar. 15, 2012).
21
Facebook Pages, http://www.facebook.com/pages/learn.php (last visited Feb. 22,
2012).
22
Facebook Media Kit, Building Your Business with Facebook Pages, available at
http://ads.ak.facebook.com/ads/FacebookAds/FB_PagesGuide_MediaKit_051611.pdf.
23
See Facebook Developers, supra note 17.
24
Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 75 (Feb. 1, 2012).
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for access to its platform. As of 2012 Facebook had two primary sources of
revenue. It sells advertising spots on its page.25 It also requires social
games that use Facebook to accept payments using Facebook’s virtual
currency (Facebook Credits) and takes 30 percent of the credits when they
were redeemed.26
Free is a common price for multi-sided platforms.27 The following
are examples:
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•

Access to physical and online shopping malls are free to
shoppers.
Access to APIs for many software development platforms, and
the ability to sell the resulting applications for use with that
platform, are often free to developers.
Online search engines are free to the user.
Listing services such as the “yellow pages” are free to the user.
Transaction services for credit and debit cards are usually free
for consumers or even subsidized with reward points.
Many media are free to the user including free-television, freeradio, various free magazines and newspapers, and most webbased media.
Receivers of money from money transmittal platforms do not
pay.
Press-release distribution services are free to media services.

Other platforms offer a price to one side that, while positive, does
not typically exceed the marginal cost of serving those customers and
therefore does not generate incremental profit. Examples include:
•
•
•

Video game consoles sold to consumers.
Many newspapers and magazines.
Liquidity providers on financial exchanges.

Not all multi-sided platforms have unbalanced pricing structures.
Some magazines such as People Magazine earn significant revenues from

25

It sells targeted ads and charges advertisers a fee for every click the ad receives.
See Platform Policies: Facebook Credits Terms,
http://developers.facebook.com/policy/credits (“When you redeem Credits with us we will
redeem them at the rate of $0.10 per Credit, less a service fee of $0.03 per credit
redeemed.”) (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
27
See David S. Evans, Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries,
2(3) REV. NETWORK ECON. 191, 195 (2003).
26
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both subscribers and advertisers28 and dating platforms such as eHarmony
charge men and women the same prices.29
B. Economic Reasons for Free Prices
In the one-sided markets traditionally studied by economists, the profitmaximizing price is always greater than or equal to the marginal cost of
production.30 Economists have identified various exceptions to this rule.31
Businesses sometimes price below cost to attract customers that will either
buy profitable products when they visit the store or will become repeat
customers who will buy profitable products in the future. Businesses may
produce several complementary products. It is possible that a firm could
maximize profit by selling one product at below marginal cost to stimulate
the purchase of the complementary product at above marginal cost; this is
the famous razor-blade strategy.32 Businesses could also price below cost
for predatory reasons.33 However, it is uncommon to observe products that
are being provided for free for sustained periods of time in one-sided
markets.
In multi-sided markets, economists have shown that the profitmaximizing price for one side can be below marginal cost including at or
below zero as a matter of theory.34 As a matter of fact, for many multi-sided
platforms the price on at least one side is at or below marginal costs.35
Profit-maximizing prices can be at or below zero for one side because
the low price attracts users on that side who increase the demand by the
28

See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, CATALYST CODE: THE STRATEGIES
BEHIND THE WORLD’S MOST DYNAMIC COMPANIES 105 (2007).
29
eHarmony Membership Options,
http://www.eharmony.com/singles/servlet/about/membership (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
30
See Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
58-59 (4th ed., 2005) (stating that price equals marginal cost under perfect competition); id.
at 89-93 (proposing that price is greater than marginal cost under monopoly).
31
See David S. Evans, Antitrust Economics of Free, 7(1) COMP. POL’Y INT’L 71 (Apr.
2011).
32
See Randal C. Picker, The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s) (Univ. of Chicago Law &
Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 532, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676444.
33
Patrick Bolton, Joseph P. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan (2000), Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 8 GEO. L.J., 88, 2239-2330 (2000).
34
See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided
Markets, 1(4) J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003); Mark Armstrong, Competition in two-sided
markets, 37(3) RAND J. ECON. 668 (2006). Schmalensee has shown for two of the leading
models of two-sided markets that these below-cost prices arise when the demand functions
of the two sides are sufficiently different from each other See Richard Schmalensee, Why is
Platform Pricing Generally Highly Skewed?, 10(4) REV. NETWORK ECON. 1274 (2011).
35
See Evans, supra note 27, at 191, 193.
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other side. A newspaper, for example, gets more revenue from advertisers
when it lowers its subscription price because it has more readers that
advertisers want to reach. So long at the extra profit that it picks up from
advertisers exceeds the profit that it loses from subscribers it will make
more money. Following this logic, newspapers and magazines often charge
readers less than the marginal cost.36 Some physical newspapers—
especially local ones in the United States—are given away for free.
Several factors influence whether the customers on one side get the
platform product or service for free. If customers on side A are particularly
valuable to customers on side B the platform has an incentive to invest in
acquiring the customers on side A so it can sell them to side B. It may
acquire these customers by providing valuable services for free.
The relative elasticity of demand also plays a role. Customers on side A
might have more elastic demand (perhaps because they have many low-cost
substitutes for the service being provided available) than customers on side
B. Increasing prices above zero would result in the loss of many side A
customers which would then make the platform much less valuable to side
B. In this case the increase of revenue from imposing fees on side A is
likely to be lower than the decrease in revenue from side B which has
access to many fewer side A customers.
Customers on side A might be able to make the decision on which
platform customers on side B must use. Some authors have argued that this
is the case for payment cards.37 The consumer decides which card to pay
with at the store and the merchant may have to take this card if it wants to
make a sale. It is profitable to subsidize the consumer to get them to use the
platform’s card and make up the losses from the merchant.
Multi-sided platforms face challenges in starting up that may also
require them to begin by making one side free.38 Often, platforms must have
both sides on board to have a viable product. An exchange must have both
buyers and sellers, a heterosexual dating venue must have both men and
women, and a payment network must have senders and receivers of money.
Moreover, they must have enough members on both sides to create value.
Some customers may be willing to come on board at the beginning because
36

See Ulrich Kaiser & Julian Wright, Price Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence
from the Magazine Industry, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1, 13-14 (2006); Patrick Van
Cayseele & Stijn Vanormelingen, Prices and Network Effects in Two-Sided Markets: The
Belgian Newspaper Industry 21 (Working Paper May 27, 2009).
37
See, e.g., Özlem Bedre-Defolie & Emilio Calvano, Pricing Payment Cards (ESMT,
Working Paper No. 10, 2010).
38
See David S. Evans, How Catalysts Ignite: The Economics of Platform-Based StartUps, in PLATFORMS, MARKETS AND INNOVATION 163 (Annabelle Gawer ed., 2009); David
S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in Platform
Businesses, 9(4) REV. NETWORK ECON. 1 (2010).
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they are unusually optimistic that the number of customers on the other side
will grow, because they are early adopters, or just curious. But to keep these
customers the platform has to grow. If it does not grow then customers on
each side will leave, making it more difficult to attract new customers, and
leading the platform to contract. A platform must adopt pricing that
achieves a critical mass of customers quickly enough to lead to ignition
rather than implosion.39 That may require adopting a zero price. Once
competing platforms have adopted a zero price it may be difficult for any of
them to deviate significantly from it.
The optimal price to one side may be negative. In some cases it may be
possible to offer rewards for joining or using a platform. Many credit cards
in the United States offer rewards. Consumers do not pay anything to make
a transaction and also receive rewards. As a result consumers are paying a
negative price for making a transaction. Some search engines have provided
financial incentives to engage in commercial search.40 More commonly,
platforms compete for users by providing valuable services. Free television
stations do not charge for people viewing their shows and, moreover,
compete in acquiring and developing shows that will attract an audience.
C. Open versus Closed Platforms
The decision to make a platform free to customers on one side is closely
related to the choice the platform makes concerning how open it is. A
platform is fully closed if no one can use it without authorization while a
platform is fully open if there are no barriers to using it. Most platforms fall
between these two extremes. Everyone can get into a shopping mall but not
every store can rent space even if they are willing to pay for it.
A platform that wants to charge for using its platform must have gating
mechanisms for preventing those who have not paid from getting access to
its platform. Video game consoles platform providers such as the Sony
PlayStation require game developers to enter into contracts to write games
for their consoles. The game developers agree to pay royalties for games
they sell for the console and in return are given access to the platforms
software code as well as other information that helps facilitate writing
games for the console. Dating venues such as nightclubs may charge for
admittance and may even exclude people who are willing to pay.
A platform that wants to make access to its platform free does not
necessarily need gating mechanisms. It may want to invest in making the
39

See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 28, at ch 4.
See, e.g., iRazoo, http://www.irazoo.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). See generally
David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy,
23(3) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 37 (2009).
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barriers to using its platform as low as possible and even provide subsidies
in kind to getting on board the platform. Facebook provides developers
with free access to its software platform as well as information and tools to
help developers create applications. Shopping malls are usually completely
open to the public and ones in suburbs often provide free parking to help
lower the cost of coming to the mall.
Platforms usually retain the ability to exclude customers even when they
have decided to make the platform open and free to these customers.41 For
example, Facebook does not charge people for Facebook pages but it can
exclude people who engage in prohibited behavior such as using fake
identities or engaging in hate speech.42
D. Free Services for Businesses
Businesses often comprise at least one side of multi-sided platforms. In
some cases multi-sided platforms adopt business models, including pricing
structures, in which businesses on one side of their platforms do not pay for
obtaining access to the platform, using services provided by the platform, or
interacting with users on the other sides of the platform. Businesses get
everything for free or below cost.
Multi-sided software platforms commonly offer free services to
business users.43 A software platform acts as an intermediary between
developers of applications and users of those applications. The platform
makes code available to application developers through “application
programming interfaces” (APIs) and provides them with “software
development kits” (SDKs). These APIs and SDKs help developers write
applications that work on the platforms and therefore provides them to
people that want to use applications on the platform. The availability of
these applications makes the platform more valuable to users.
Computer operating system providers such as Apple and Microsoft
provided free or low cost access to APIs and SDKs to stimulate the
production of applications for their platforms. The creations of “killer
applications” such as VisiCalc for Apple’s operating system and Lotus 123
for Microsoft’s operating system helped drive the success of those
platforms. The Apple iOS and Android OS software platforms for mobile
41

See generally David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided
Platforms, 27(1) BERKELEY TECH. L. J. (forthcoming Spring 2012).
42
See Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,
http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
43
See DAVID S. EVANS, ANDREI HAGIU & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, INVISIBLE
ENGINES: HOW SOFTWARE PLATFORMS DRIVE INNOVATION AND TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES
(2006).
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phones have followed a similar approach. Developers of free applications
pay little for access to those platforms.44
Many Internet-based platforms have also created APIs and SDKs to
help developers create applications for their users. Typically, the software
platform that helps developers reach users is just one part of their business;
that is, they have appended a software platform to add a developer side to
another multi-sided platform. Social networks such as Facebook and
LinkedIn, for example, have developed software platforms that enable
developers to access their social graphs. Payments systems such as PayPal
have also created APIs that allow developers to access their payments
features and their users.45
Search engines also typically provide free services to websites including
those operated by businesses. They identify these websites, include them in
the search engine database, index them using sophisticated algorithms, and
enable users to find content from these websites (and links to them) in
response to search requests. They typically provide websites with code and
directions for helping the search engine index the content on their sites.46
The search engines typically do not charge websites anything for these
services.
Businesses obtain value from these free platform services. Application
developers obtain code that reduces their cost of development. More
importantly, they obtain access to customers. Websites obtain the ability to
make themselves known to a global audience of searchers. In fact,
businesses can earn significant profits as a result of receiving free platform
services. Two extreme cases in which startups that obtained free platform
services had achieved multi-billion market capitalizations illustrate the
point.
Lotus 123 was the leading spreadsheet software for personal computers
from the early 1980s until the early 1990s. It relied on Microsoft’s MSDOS and Windows software platforms. Microsoft did not charge Lotus 123
for the ability to use its platforms. Lotus also developed other software
applications for personal computers that relied on free access to the
software platform. Lotus was sold to IBM for $3.54 billion in 1995.
Zynga, which started in April 2007, developed several social games for
Facebook including Farmville, Cityville, and MafiaWars. These games had
more than 200 million active monthly users by November 2011. Zynga
44

See iOS Developer Program: Program Enrollment, supra note 7.
See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Innovation in Payments, in MOVING
MONEY: THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PAYMENTS 36 (Robert E. Litan & Martin Neil Baily
eds., 2009).
46
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visited Feb. 23, 2012).
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used the Facebook software platform to develop these games. Facebook
users could install these games and play. Zynga made money by selling
virtual goods. Facebook did not charge Zynga anything for access to its
platform until April 2010 at which point it effectively imposed a tax of 30
percent on Zynga’s revenues from selling virtual goods on its games on
Facebook. After going public in late 2011 Zynga had a market
capitalization of more than $7 billion.
Modern multi-sided platforms have attracted very large numbers of
businesses to their free services. Table 1 provides a summary for selected
platforms. It reports approximate numbers when they are available and
rough orders of magnitude when they are not. In many cases there is data on
the number of applications; some businesses may write multiple
applications. While the figures in the table do not provide a precise count
of businesses that use free services of multi-sided platforms, they show the
likely range goes from the hundreds to thousands to the many millions.
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Table 1: Free Business Users of Multi-Sided Platforms
Platform

Number of Businesses
Applications

Example

Microsoft Windows

4 million47

TurboTax

Facebook Software Platform

More than 550 thousand active
applications48

Zynga’s Farmville

Facebook Fan Pages

37 million with 10 or more
likes49
Tens of millions50

Lady Gaga

Google Android

450,00051

Out of Milk

Apple iOS

500,00052

Angry Birds

PayPalX

1000s53

Rentalics

Twitter Broadcasts

1000s

Discover Card

Twitter Software Platform

1 million54

Twitscoop

Search Engines (Baidu,
Bing, Google, and Yahoo)

PYMNTS.com

III. THE PLATFORM DEPENDENCY DECISION
Building a business based on free services from a multi-sided platform
sounds like a good deal as the examples above illustrate. But it carries risk.
47

Ina Fried, Live-blogging Steve Ballmer, CNET (Jan. 6, 2010),
http://www.cnet.com/8301-31045_1-10426723-269.html.
48
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_Platform. This figure was from 2010.
Facebook does not currently report a separate number on active applications.
49
Id.
50
February 2012 Web Server Survey, NETCRAFT,
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2012/02/07/february-2012-web-server-survey.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2012).
51
Andy Rubin, Android@Mobile World Congress: It’s all about the ecosystem,
GOOGLE (Feb. 27, 2012), http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/2012/02/androidmobile-worldcongress-its-all.html.
52
The iPhone App Store, http://www.apple.com/iphone/built-in-apps/app-store.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
53
Damon Hougland, PayPal X Developers Driving Innovation, PAYPAL BLOG (May
25, 2010), https://www.thepaypalblog.com/2010/05/paypal-x-developers-drivinginnovation.
54
Jennifer Van Grove, Twitter’s Ecosystem Now Includes 1 Million Apps, MASHABLE
(July 11, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/07/11/twitter-1-million-applications.

18

Excessive Litigation and Free Internet Platform Services

Understanding this will become important for analyzing the adverse
selection problem in the next section.
Consider a hypothetical entrepreneur, Jill, who has developed the
recipe for an incredible tasting burger. She opens Jill’s Awesome Burger
(JAB) restaurants. JAB does not invest any money in marketing or
advertising. Instead it uses social media—primarily Facebook—to get the
word out that JAB is the place to go for the finest burger on the planet. JAB
acquires 50 million Facebook fans in the United States in its first three years
in business. JAB can send messages to these fans on a regular basis.
Advertising and marketing usually comprise a significant portion of costs
for consumer brands.55 JAB can profitably offer lower prices and better
service because it avoids those costs.
JAB’s business has, however, become dependent on its ability to use
Facebook. It bears risk.56 Facebook could make changes that could sharply
reduce JAB’s ability to reach its fans. The social network could decide that
people are getting too many unwanted messages and therefore reduce the
ability of an entity to reach its fans; limit the availability of data for privacy
reasons; or charge companies with fan pages significant fees to help
increase Facebook’s earnings.
JAB is in a very different position than McDonald’s. Operating a fan
page is just one of many things that McDonald’s does to promote its
restaurants. Over the decades it has invested in a brand. In addition to
advertising it invested in the quality of its food and restaurants thereby
attracting new customers and retaining old ones. Of course, McDonald’s
has made these investments over half a century and during its first four
decades it did not have access to search engines, social networks, or other
large free platforms for making itself known. Many new consumer
businesses, however, continue to use methods other than free online
services to establish their brand images and attract customers.57
Entrepreneurs starting business in the Internet age face decisions on
how much they want to depend on multi-sided platforms and the free
55

See George Bittlingmayer, Advertising, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Advertising.html.
56
This is not a problem unique to multi-sided platforms or to free business services.
Firms buy goods and services from other firms as a matter of course. They face the threat
that the terms of trade could change against them. Prices of supplies could rise or become
unavailable. A trading partner could turn into a competitor. Businesses manage these
hazards through multiple sourcing of supplies and producing critical components
themselves. Multi-sided platforms magnify these reliance issues, for the reasons discussed
in the introduction, and therefore warrant the focused analysis in this article.
57
See JOHN BURNETT, CORE CONCEPTS OF MARKETING 201, 203, 207-211 (1st ed.
2008), available at
http://globaltext.terry.uga.edu/userfiles/pdf/Core%20Concepts%20of%20Marketing.pdf.
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services they provide.
A. Yelp versus Angie’s List
A comparison between Angie’s List and Yelp—two businesses that
rely on consumer reviews of local businesses—highlights the different
choices entrepreneurs make concerning relying on free services from open
platforms.
Yelp has a platform that consists of “the contributors who write
reviews, the consumers who read them and the local businesses they
describe.”58 At the end of 2011 it had 22 million reviews, 529,000 business
locations, and 61 million unique visitors.59 Consumers do not pay for
visiting the site and businesses do not pay for listings on the site. Although
Yelp pays people to do reviews when it enters a market60 it mainly relies
on consumers to write reviews on their own.61 Yelp makes money from
selling advertising on its web pages to local businesses. For example, the
Yelp.com page for plumbers in Boston has a Yelp ad for Roto-Rooter at
the top of the page.62
Consumers use Yelp.com to find out about local businesses. Yelp lists
the businesses in a category, provides a rating (on a scale of 1-5 stars)
based on the reviews they have for each business, and provides contact and
location information. Consumers could get to the relevant page for local
businesses by typing in Yelp.com in their browser.63 Once the website
comes up they could then search for the particular type of business they are
interested in a search bar at the top of the Yelp.com page. They could also
use a search engine to find out about a particular kind of business. The
search results might provide a link to a Yelp.com web page with
information. Clicking on the link would then take the consumer to that
page.
The consumer experience differs depending on whether the consumer
conducts a search or goes to the site directly. Consider looking for a Greek
restaurant in Boston. Under the direct method, the consumer types in
Yelp.com in their browser. They then type in “Greek restaurant” in the
search bar in Yelp; they also select Boston if they are a first-time user.
58

Yelp! Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 47 (Nov. 17, 2011).
Id., at 61.
60
Jeremy Stoppelman, Comment to Why Yelp Works, NEW YORK TIMES BLOG (May
13, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/why-Yelp-works/#comment198253.
61
Yelp! Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), supra note 59, at 1.
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YELP, http://www.Yelp.com/c/boston/plumbing (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
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The user might also conduct a navigational query with search by typing in yelp.com
in the search toolbar. This would take them to a link for the yelp.com home page.
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Yelp provides a list of Greek restaurants in the Boston area. Before this
list it also provides a series of choices for narrowing down the choice by
area, price, and other considerations.
Under the search method, the consumer types in Greek restaurant
Boston in their search engine. With Google the consumer is presented with
a link to a Yelp.com page on the first page of search results. Clicking that
link takes the consumer to a web page that lists the top Greek restaurants
including a featured restaurant, provides links to search by various
features, and provides a longer list of Greek restaurants.
As it turns out, the majority of visits to Yelp.com result from people
conducting searches. In February 2012, a leading source of web data,
compete.com, reports that about 62 percent of the traffic to Yelp.com came
from search.64 That is not surprising. Yelp has not invested significantly in
branding or other activities to persuade consumers to go directly to
Yelp.com.65 Yelp’s large quantity of searchable reviews tends to increase
its search rankings. Like other businesses that rely on search engines it has
invested in “search engine optimization” to increase its rankings.66
The consumer may also save time and get better results by conducting
a search query than going directly to yelp.com. It takes fewer keystrokes to
obtain information from search (type “Greek restaurant Boston” in search,
type “enter”, press “click”) than directly (type “Yelp.com” in browser, type
“enter”, type “Greek restaurant Boston,” type “enter”).67 Although the user
has to locate the link in the search results Yelp has succeeded in getting its
link placed high in the search results and is therefore highly visible.
Consumers may prefer the web page Yelp presents following a search
since it highlights several restaurants at the top rather than presenting the
long list provided in response to a search on the Yelp.com page.
Yelp’s design, investment, and other business choices therefore reflect
a decision to rely very heavily on non-navigational68 referral traffic from
general search engines.
Angie’s List has taken a different approach.69 The company helps
64

Compete.com PRO Database, February 2012. Some of these search queries could
have involved navigational queries.
65
The majority of its sales and marketing expenses are for acquiring local businesses
as customers. Yelp! Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), supra note 58 at 49 (Nov. 17,
2011). Its S-1 filing does not mention incurring significant costs for the acquisition of
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See SEOmoz, http://www.seomoz.org/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
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Navigational search traffic results when a user types in the URL or name into the
search engine instead of entering the URL into the browser.
69
See Angie’s List, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 2, 3 (Nov. 2, 2011).

Excessive Litigation and Free Internet Platform Services

21

consumers purchase services such as “home remodeling, plumbing, roof
repair, health care and automotive care … [that] are typically expensive
and carry a high cost to the consumer if performed poorly.” It has done
this by recruiting members who pay for access to the reviews written by
other members and have the opportunity to write reviews themselves. As
of September 2011, Angie’s List had roughly 1 million members and
earned 38 percent of its revenue in the first nine months of 2011 from those
members. Unlike Yelp, Angie’s List has adopted an approach where
consumers pay for access, and in which the consumers provide a
significant source of revenue.
Angie’s List does not rely significantly on search engines. Its content is
behind a pay firewall and is therefore not directly accessible from search
engines. Links to the company’s website do appear in organic search
results—for example in response to “plumber review”—but clicking on the
result link takes the user to a page that offers the user the opportunity to join
as a member. During February 2012, 34 percent of the visits to Angie’s
List came from search.70
Unlike Yelp, Angie’s List relies heavily on advertising to recruit
consumers. Its television and radio commercials emphasize how consulting
its directory can steer the consumer towards excellent contractors (e.g., as
one of its ads highlights, the plumber who takes the dog out for a walk
while the housewife is delayed coming home) and away from unscrupulous
ones (e.g., as one of its ads highlights, the house painter who watches adult
movies while on the job as the housewife discovers from her cable bill).
According to a financial filing in preparation for its IPO,71
Our membership growth has been driven largely by our national
advertising strategy, which resulted in our marketing expense of
$30.2 million and $48.0 million in 2010 and the nine months ended
September 30, 2011, respectively. We continue to scale our
investment in advertising to grow our membership base. In 2010 and
the nine months ended September 30, 2011, our revenue was $59.0
million and $62.6 million, respectively.
Angie’s List also earns revenue from advertising but has taken a
different approach than Yelp. Members grade businesses on a scale of A-F.
Angie’s List solicits advertising from businesses that received grades of A
or B. Of the 815,000 businesses with reviews as of September 2011, 26
percent had grades of A or B and, of those, 10 percent purchased
advertising. This advertising accounted for the other 62 percent of Angie’s
70

Compete PRO Database, January 2012.
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List revenues for the first nine months of 2011.
Angie’s List and Yelp took very different approaches towards
developing enterprises based on consumer reviews of local businesses.
Yelp chose to rely on search engines to attract consumers while Angie’s
List chose to focus on investing in its brand and reputation.
What’s behind businesses making such diametrically opposed
decisions?
B. The Tradeoffs on Platform Reliance
There are benefits and costs in relying on a platform even if it is
providing those services for free. A rational entrepreneur would consider
these tradeoffs in deciding on the extent to which they should rely on free
platform services. It would choose the optimal degree of reliance based on
these considerations. Businesses make different decisions concerning the
degree of reliance based on how they evaluate these tradeoffs.
There are two major benefits of working with a platform. The
entrepreneur obtains access to customers that constitute another side of the
platform. PayPal X developers have access to the over 100 million active
account holders and to the 9 million businesses72 that accept PayPal online
for payment. That access dramatically reduces the cost of acquiring
customers.
The other benefit is that the entrepreneur often obtains the ability to use
some set of assets that facilitate providing services to those customers.
Software platforms, for example, include access to APIs, software tools,
and information that enable developers to write applications. These assets
could result in relatively low capital costs for starting a new business.
These benefits are readily seen in the development of applications for
mobile devices. Developers obtained access to the 29 million iPhone users
and 46 million Android users in the US at the end of 2011.73 They also
obtained development tools such as software development kits and
instructional materials. Developing an application for iOS and Android
operating systems requires virtually no capital and relatively little labor.
72

X.Commerce, X.Commerce Press Kit,
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http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/2/comScore_Reports_Dece
mber_2011_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
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Responding to these incentives developers had created more than 500
thousand applications for the iPhone operating system (iOS) and 400
thousand for the Android operating system as of the end of 2011, as shown
in Table 1.
The entrepreneur faces at least five major risks in building her business
on top of a platform that is providing free access to customers and free
services. These problems exist for all businesses that rely on another
business but they are larger in the case of businesses that rely on free
platform services.
(1) The platform could raise its prices. When Zynga started developing
games Facebook did not charge it anything and did not require it to share
any revenues. Then Facebook decided to take roughly 30 percent of the
revenues earned from the sale of virtual goods by social games, which is
how Zynga and other games on Facebook earn most of their revenues.
(2) The platform could make changes that reduce the value of the
service it is providing to businesses that rely on it. That is a common
complaint against search engines such as Baidu and Google.74 Search
engines change their algorithms for selecting search results periodically to
present better results and to reduce efforts to game the algorithm. That can
result in some websites falling in the rankings and therefore being presented
to fewer users.
(3) The platform could change the rules for participating and close off
access. Apple screens applications that are submitted to the Apple Store.75
Its screening criteria have changed over time and could change in the future
for many reasons including a decision to promote its own applications.76
(4) The platform could also decide to integrate into a side of the
platform and therefore produce complementary products entirely
themselves. Microsoft, for example, became the leading provider of
productivity applications for the Windows operating system.77
(5) The platform could decline or fail thereby reducing the value of the
investment. Once-dominant platforms such as Symbian in mobile operating
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systems and MySpace in social network declined precipitously.78
The entrepreneur might be able to mitigate these risks in particular
circumstances. In some platform industries it is possible for customers on
one side of the platform to use several platforms—that is consumers could
engage in what is known as “multi-homing”.79 Many banks, for example,
issue both MasterCard and Visa credit cards and can shift volume between
them depending on business terms. Even if an entrepreneur only uses one
platform at a time it may be possible to switch between them. Banks usually
issue either MasterCard of Visa debit cards but some banks switch
programs for various business reasons.
The ability to multi-home depends in part on the extent of platformspecific investments, which can in turn affect the extent to which platforms
compete with each other for customers on a side. Developers, for example,
can write applications for different smart phones and their operating
systems. However, because of differences in software (such as between
iOS, Android, and Windows) and hardware (such as between Apple
iPhones and the various phones that use Android and Windows) there are
costs associated with developing for multiple platforms and those costs may
limit, or in some cases prevent, multi-homing. By contrast, the practices
that a website publisher users to optimize for one search engine tends to
optimize it for others as well.
In other cases competition among platforms is so intense that there is no
real issue of platform dependency. That is the case with most advertising.
In the United States businesses are not dependent on television networks—
platforms that connect advertisers and viewers—for national advertising
because there are several competing networks and many alternatives for
reaching viewers through a variety of television, radio, print, and online
media.
The entrepreneur could also take actions, including investments, to
reduce the reliance on the platform. That is most clearly seen in the case of
websites. They can invest in branding and marketing activities to drive
traffic to their websites. That is what Angie’s List has done.
The entrepreneur could also decide to bypass the platform and provide
the platform services itself. When Sears decided to introduce a generalpurpose credit card (Discover) in the early 1980s it could have become an
78
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issuer of MasterCard or Visa cards. Instead it chose to create its own credit
card system—the Discover Card. AT&T faced with the same decision a
few years later chose to become a MasterCard issuer.80
C. The Entrepreneur’s Decision on the Degree of Platform Dependency
The reliance decision is determined simultaneously with the decision on
what opportunity to pursue, how to pursue it, and whether to pursue it.
Entrepreneurs sort themselves into pursuits based on their own situations,
the business opportunities they have identified, and the alternative avenues
available to them.81 One of the factors that they have to consider in this
process is whether and to what extent to rely on a platform.
The economic literature on entrepreneurship has identified three key
factors behind the decision to start a business.
Quality. Entrepreneurs and the new firms they found differ in their
abilities.82 They generally do not know with certainty either their own
abilities or how those abilities will evolve with experience. They obtain
more information about how good they are by operating a business and
seeing how they do. A related concept concerns how good a business idea
they have.83 They usually do not know that either. They learn more as a
result of getting into the market and observing demand and costs.
Access to capital. New entrepreneurs are often liquidity constrained.84
80

See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE
DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 77-79 (2002).
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Entry, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 929 (2006); Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen,
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 1909, 2007); Daniela Grieco, The Entrepreneurial Decision:
Theories, Determinants, and Constraints (LIUC Papers in Economics No. 207, 2007).
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(1978); supra note 81.
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Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints, 97(4) J. POL. ECON. 808 (1989);
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Constraints, 102 J. POL. ECON. 53 (1994).; David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald,
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That is, they cannot obtain as much capital as they would like to obtain at
risk-adjusted interest rates to start their businesses. They may not be able to
obtain any external financing at all. In this case they have to rely on their
own savings or ability to take out personal loans such as those from credit
cards. Other entrepreneurs may have access to significant capital either
because they are large corporations or serial entrepreneurs who invest their
own funds or have an excellent track record that increases the willingness of
investors to back them.
Taste for risk. Entrepreneurs vary in their taste for risk.85 Some may be
willing to take very long odds while others are more averse to risk. Relative
to the general population entrepreneurs on average have a higher tolerance
for risk. Of course, it is the risk tolerance of investors that determines
whether and how much capital these investors will extend to the startup.
These three factors operate interdependently in determining whether an
entrepreneur will start a business and how much capital they will be able to
invest in that business. Investors will be less willing to extend capital to
startups that they perceive as lower quality given what they know about the
entrepreneur and the business idea. The entrepreneur herself may also be
less willing to invest given what she knows about herself and the business
plan. Entrepreneurs that are less risk averse, or more confident in the
overall quality of their business, will be willing to invest more of their own
capital and time.
Free platform services are more attractive, all else equal, to
entrepreneurs that face liquidity constraints. They can start a business with
minimal capital requirements. Many of the platforms discussed above
enable entrepreneurs to develop businesses and access customers with
minimal capital expenditures. Free platform services are also more
attractive to entrepreneurs that are less confident in their own ability or the
quality of their ideas. They can also learn about their own abilities as an
entrepreneur and the quality of their business idea without risking their own
capital.
An important implication of these observations is that entrepreneurs that
are perceived by themselves or investors as having uncertain abilities or
ideas are more likely to sort themselves into relying free platform services.
That is because these startups face tighter liquidity constraints and face
85
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greater risks of failure. Of course well-funded high quality startups may
choose to use free platform services for a multitude or reasons. The point
here is that by offering free services the platform tends to pull in poorly
funded startups with relatively low a priori prospects for success as well.

IV. EXCESSIVE LITIGATION OVER FREE PLATFORM SERVICES
Multi-sided platforms can maximize private profits and social welfare
by providing free platform services as shown earlier. However, by
providing free services these platforms can sow the seeds of their own
destruction through litigation or other governmental process.
Whenever two businesses enter into a transaction they incur the risk that
their counterparty will sue. However, this risk is greatly magnified in the
case of multisided platforms. By providing free services the platform may
attract a very large number of entrepreneurs. If the platform is successful,
for example, it faces the risk that a court or competition authority would
view it as a dominant firm and that entrepreneurs could claim that the
platform has violated the competition laws. While the entrepreneurs are
associated with a more valuable platform they have also acquired a more
valuable litigation option.
The platform is also susceptible to much more litigation and or other
adversarial actions as it becomes more successful. It faces a rising
probability of being sued as it attracts many entrepreneurs. Although the
probability that any single entrepreneur suing is small the likelihood that at
least one will sue rises rapidly86 as the platform grows. The number of
complaints rises as well. As a result highly successful platforms can be
swept up in adversarial proceedings.
Free platform services also tend to attract entrepreneurs that are
liquidity constrained and which have low a priori expectations of success
on the part of investors and perhaps even themselves. These entrepreneurs
are more likely to encounter business problems or fail thereby laying the
basis, for example, for a claim of antitrust injury.
The availability of the litigation option, the large number of business
users, and adverse selection work can together to generate enough
86

If the annual probability of a single entrepreneur suing is p, lawsuits are independent
events, and the platform attracts N entrepreneurs, then the probability of at least one
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complaints to result in a material likelihood that there will be at least one
false-positive decision against the platform. That false-positive decision
could involve significant behavioral or structural remedies or financial
penalties under the antitrust or unfair competition laws or the
implementation of restrictive platform-specific laws or regulations. In
addition, irrespective of the final results of these complaints, dealing with
frequent and numerous complaints involving responses to government
authorities could take up significant amounts of management time.
A. The Litigation Option
The “litigation option” refers to the ability to file a complaint, or more
generally pursue an adversarial proceeding, against the platform in the event
that certain events happen that could make a lawsuit or other use of
government processes to seek redress viable. This option has positive
expected value. The business does not have to file a lawsuit, for example,
just as a person does not have to exercise a stock option. The business will
file a lawsuit in the future if it has positive expected value at that time just
as the purchase of a stock option reflects the expectation that it has positive
value. Although litigation is costly the business will choose to incur these
costs only if it expects the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
Moreover, the costs of lodging a complaint with a competition authority, for
example, are relatively small.
Businesses, of course, always acquire an option to sue their suppliers,
customers, or other business partners when they enter into an arrangement.
Typically, these disputes result in breach of contract lawsuits for failure to
pay or failure to perform. Generally, the business that sues successfully
would be able to collect its actual losses (perhaps including attorneys fees).
These business disputes would usually occur in the civil courts unless there
was criminal conduct—fraud for example—at issue. Government
authorities would not ordinarily get involved in these contract disputes
between businesses.
Businesses can pursue their complaints in a variety of venues and a
number of ways and thereby impose costs and risks on their platform
provider.87 They can pursue complaints under a variety of legal theories.
87

The cost and benefit of pursuing complaints varies across jurisdictions. In the U.S.
private litigation is costly and the odds of success antitrust plaintiffs are long; however,
treble damages can make the awards high especially for class-action law firms. In other
jurisdictions, modest expenditures can result in a regulatory authority initiating an
investigation. The complainant would not get damages directly but could get beneficial
remedies.
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For example, in Aldridge v. Microsoft the application provider sued the
platform for business disparagement, defamation, tortuous interference with
contract, tortuous interference with business relations, monopolization, and
attempted monopolization.88 They can pursue complaints in multiple
jurisdictions or the laws of multiple jurisdictions. A California-based
company that has a merchant page on Facebook and that sells globally
could, for example, file claims in the U.S. under California, US, and EU
laws as well as possibly the laws of many other jurisdictions. In addition to
lawsuits, businesses can lobby for the passage of laws or regulations that
restrict the platform on the grounds, for example, that is an essential facility
that should be subject to common carrier regulations. The prospect that
platforms will be subject to what Judge Posner has described as “cluster
bomb” attacks is increased by the fact that, given the global reach of the
Internet and the ability to replicate the digital delivery of products and
services across many countries, both the platform and its business users are
likely to operate in many jurisdictions.89
One of most common complaints by business users of free platforms is
that the platform has engaged in anticompetitive practices. To help explore
the scope of the litigation option it is useful to focus on this particular claim.
To pursue this claim in many jurisdictions the business user has to argue
that the platform has significant market power—a “dominant firm” under
EU law or a “monopoly” under US law—and that it has pursued practices
that exclude competition from the market.
Under EU law a firm is presumed “dominant” if its market share
exceeds 50 percent90 although some cases have considered firms to be
dominant with shares as low as 40 percent.91 In the United States, under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act,92 a firm is considered to have monopoly
power if it has a predominant market share; some courts have held that 90
percent is enough to meet that standard, probably 70 percent or more, but
88
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probably not as low as 60 percent.93 Generally, competition authorities and
courts have a great deal of latitude for defining markets narrowly for the
purpose of determining these shares. Therefore, complainants have the
prospect of persuading the competition and courts that the platform is a
dominant firm.
To pursue an antitrust complaint—under Sherman Section 2 or Article
102 TFEU for example—business users would generally need to be able to
persuade competition authorities or courts that the platform is foreclosing
competition. That would usually involve showing the user and the platform
are competing with each other in the same market or that the platform is
trying to extend its alleged dominant position in one market to a
downstream market in which the user is competing. That imposes some
limitation on the ability of free users of platform services to pursue an
antitrust claim. However, the antitrust laws provide complainants with
considerable flexibility in fashioning theories and interpretations of facts
that can result in facially plausible claims. In particular, in the EU and other
jurisdictions, dominant firms have a “special responsibility not to … impair
competition” and that language can be interpreted to condemn many
business practices.94
Generally, complainants can argue that they compete with the platform
in a primary market. For example:
• a software platform provider and an application provider that
exposes APIs and therefore could provide platform features;
• a search engine provider and a website that curates content;
• a social network and an application that in part provides
connections between people).
Complainants can also argue that the platform is trying to leverage its
platform dominance into a downstream market and thereby excluding
93

For a summary of the case law, see Chapter 2: Monopoly Power, in U.S. DEP’T OF
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competition from that market:
• a software platform provider that includes a feature that could
also be provided by an application:
• a search engine provider that provides various services as part
of its search results;
• a social network that provides services including applications.
In some jurisdictions, business users of free platform services can argue
that the platform is an essential facility to which they should have access on
a fair reasonable and non-discriminatory basis. The Supreme Court decision
in Trinko sharply narrowed circumstances under which a court could
conclude that a refusal to supply access was anticompetitive.95 However,
other jurisdictions, including the EU and China, have an essential facilities
doctrine under which it is possible for business users to claim that a denial
of, or reduction in service or access, by a platform is anticompetitive and to
require access on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis.96
The value of the litigation option to business users of free platform
services arises in several different ways. As a result of a complaint a court
or competition authority may require the platform to make changes in its
business terms that would benefit the complainant. The complainant may
also be able to obtain concessions from the platform including monetary
compensation to withdraw a complaint or not to file it in the first place. In
addition, the US allows complainants to obtain treble damages.
The expected value of the litigation option varies depending on the
circumstances of the entrepreneur and the platform and can evolve over
time. The value of the option becomes higher over time as the platform
becomes more successful. As the platform becomes more successful there
is a higher likelihood that the courts and competition authorities will find
that it is a dominant firm. The value of the option is also higher for firms
that anticipate potential difficulties which would have a large effect on their
profits and that they can blame on the platform. In fact, the option provides
a valuable hedge against the risk of failure.
B. Adverse-Selection
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As observed earlier businesses realize there are benefits and costs of
relying on free services provided by a platform. Platforms tend to attract
businesses that want free services either because investors have not been
willing to fund the entrepreneurs adequately or because the entrepreneur
themselves are not confident enough in their own prospects to invest
themselves. Assuming these expectations are correct, and there is no
apparent reason they would not be, these “liquidity-constrained” business
are more likely to encounter business problems. As a result there is adverse
selection into relying on free platform services. More vulnerable businesses
are more likely on average to sort themselves into working with a platform
that provides fee services and into relying more on those free services.97
The point is not that entrepreneurs that rely on free platform services are
mainly poor or vulnerable entrepreneurs. Rather, the thesis is that platforms
tend to pull more of these liquidity-constrained firms, that tend to have
lower a priori odds of success, into their free programs.
For illustrative purposes suppose, as shown in Figure 1, there is a metric
of “quality” for entrepreneurs that stands-in for the likelihood that the
business will be successful.98 There are many high quality entrepreneurs
that rely on free platform services and many low quality entrepreneurs that
do not. The adverse selection problem results in the “average” entrepreneur
that relies on free platform services having, however, a lower quality than
the average entrepreneur in the population. It also results in the fraction of
low quality entrepreneurs being higher for businesses that rely on free
platform services than for the population overall.99
As a result of adverse selection, platforms that provide free services will
tend to have a disproportionate number of businesses that do not do well.
These businesses are more likely to complain for two reasons. They are
more likely than successful businesses to be able to claim that they have
been injured as a result of something the platform has done. The value of
97
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the litigation option is also higher for them.

Figure 1: Density function for selected versus unselected firm quality

C. Large Numbers
Almost every significant business in the United States has a website.
Most major brands in the United States also have a Facebook merchant
page.100 A recent survey found that more than 75 percent of independent
restaurants and more than 95 percent of all chain restaurants have Facebook
merchant pages.101 The number of business users of Facebook and Google
just in the United States likely exceeds 5 million.102 As Table 1 describes,
other platform businesses that provide free services also have thousands if
not millions of business users.
The large number of business users of multi-sided platform services,
combined with the fact that these platforms could be defined as dominant
firms, imposes a high risk of antitrust scrutiny, and the possibility of a
catastrophic result, on these platforms. Suppose, for example, that the
probability of a business filing an antitrust complaint is .01% (i.e., 1 out of
100
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10,000 businesses files a complaint). The expected number of complaints
would be 1 with 10,000 business users, 10 with 100,000 business users, and
100 with 1 million business users.
A slight increase in the propensity to sue as a result of adverse selection
can yield a significant increase in the number of complainants in the case of
multi-sided platforms that offer free services. Suppose, for example, that the
probability of a business exercising the litigation option increases by .001%
(i.e., from 1/10,000 to 1/100,000). The expected increase in the number of
complainants would be only 1 with 100,000 business customers but would
be 10 with 1,000,000 business customers and 100 with 10,000,000 business
customers.
Table 2 reports estimates of the expected number of complaints per year
for various assumptions concerning the number of businesses and the
likelihood of any business filing a complaint. The number of complaints is
significant with even very small probabilities of complaints.
Table 2: The Number of Complaints by Free Platform Users

0.0001%
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10,000
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1,000,000
2,000,000
5,000,000
10,000,000

0
0
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0
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100

0.01%

0.1%

1
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1,000
2,000
5,000
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IV. SEARCH-ENGINE BASED PLATFORMS
To document the phenomena discussed above, it is useful to focus on
search engines and the businesses that use free services for several reasons.
First, there are a number of businesses that use free search engine services
and they are economically significant. Many businesses have websites that
rely to varying degrees on search engines to direct users to them.
Businesses opened websites quickly after the start of the commercial
Internet in the mid 1990s. Most businesses have websites now. They rely on
them to varying degrees from providing a simple listing to being the basis
for the entire business. Two industries related to search engines have
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emerged. In 2010 US eCommerce accounted for $165.4 billion of sales (4.2
percent of all sales)103 and online advertising accounted for $26.04 billion
of advertising spending (20 percent of all advertising spending).104 Search
engines became widely used in the late 1990s and have become an integral
part of ecommerce and online advertising businesses.
Second, it is relatively straightforward to measure, and obtain data on,
the reliance of these web-based businesses on free platform services. Web
traffic can come from viewers finding the site through a search engine,
going directly to the website, which means they must have some prior
knowledge of the site, or being referred there by another site. As noted
earlier, Yelp is heavily reliant on search engines while Angie’s List is not.
Third, not surprisingly, given the large number of web-based businesses
and the number of years they have been in existence, there have been many
complaints to the courts and competition authorities. Therefore, it is
possible to examine these complaints and the associated businesses to
assess the possible importance of adverse selection.
Part A describes the business model for search engines. Search engines
index websites and their content for free, enable people to find relevant
information from these websites for free, and charge for presenting
advertisements to viewers attracted by this content. Part B summarizes data
on where web-based businesses obtain their traffic. It compares the typical
web-based business to ones that have a less search-engine-reliant model.
Part C provides an overview of the companies that have brought litigation
or filed complaints against Google. It shows that most of the complainants
have chosen a search-engine-reliant model.
A. Search Engine Business Model
Search engines have three major customer groups.
•
•
103

Websites that want people to be able to find them and their
content.
People that are looking for information and hope to find it on the
web.
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•

Advertisers that want to present advertisements to people.

The business model is straightforward despite the complexity of the
technology. The search engine aggregates content across the web. It uses
that content much like any advertising-supported media company would to
attract viewers. It then sells access to those viewers to advertisers.
Search engines have algorithms that predict the relevance of web pages
to the search query that an individual has submitted. Google initially
focused on the quality of the web page based on the number and quality of
the web pages that linked to the web page using its PageRank measure. As
of the end of 2011, Google used 200 factors, including PageRank, to select
web pages and rank them in response to a query.105 The results are then
presented in order of relevance with results extending to multiple web
pages. The probability that a person will click on a result declines sharply
with the order in the rankings with a very sharp decline after the results on
the first page. Websites that value traffic want to appear on the first page
and as high on the first page as possible.
As the search engine business has developed search engines have
provided ways for websites to make it easier for the search engines to find
the necessary information for ranking the website and therefore to achieve
greater visibility in searches. Websites can submit information to the search
engine such as a sitemap that the search engine can use to make it easier to
find information on the site. Search engines provide websites with tools
they can use to make sure that the search engine can find relevant content.
They also provide advice on how to design and manage websites to increase
the likelihood that users will be able to find relevant content. Search engines
do not charge for indexing websites, for the tools or advice they provide to
websites to improve their rankings, or for presenting web pages to users.
Because a high ranking generates more clicks websites often invest in
“search engine optimization” (SEO) to improve their rankings. (These
investments are typically not specific to the search engine.) That results in a
major source of tension between the search engines and websites. The
websites are interested as a business matter in making sales, attracting
customers, or obtaining users for selling advertising. Websites all want to
obtain high rankings but of course a higher rank for one is a lower rank for
another. They therefore have incentives to trick the search engines into
thinking that they are more relevant than they really are. The search engines
are interested as a business matter in attracting users. They do that in large
part by presenting relevant results to those users. Successful efforts by
105
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websites to trick the search engine into thinking a site is more relevant than
it is imposes costs on users and ultimately lowers the reputation of the
search engine as a reliable source of information.
B. Search Engine Reliance
Websites obtain traffic in several ways. Direct traffic occurs when a
user types in the url for the website into her browser or uses a bookmark
that directs the browser to go to that website. Search traffic occurs when an
individual uses a search engine to conduct a search and as a result clicks on
a link that takes them to that website. Referral traffic results when a user
clicks on a link from a website that is not a search engine.
When a website starts, people who are not affiliated with the website
would have no way to know that it exists except by coming across it
inadvertently. A website can do various things to become known. Like any
business it can engage in marketing activities including advertising to let
people know that it exists. These activities drive direct traffic. It can also
persuade other sites to link to it. Sites refer users to another because they
are providing a service to their users who would benefit from knowing
about the other site. Sites also engage in swaps: you refer my site and I will
refer yours. Websites can undertake search engine optimization to increase
the likelihood that their sites will appear in search results.
The share of traffic that comes from search results provides a proxy for
search-engine reliance.106 Sites that are getting the preponderance of their
traffic from direct and referral sources have made investments to establish
their brands. Sites that are getting the preponderance of their traffic from
search have primarily invested in tactics to increase their search rankings.
Data from compete.com show the distribution of the search share. The
analysis reported here is based on the 15,000 largest websites ranked by
traffic and a stratified random sample of 15,000 of the next 1 million most
heavily visited websites. The figures have been weighted to reflect the
sampling and therefore reflect the distribution of the largest 1 million
websites.107
106

It is not a perfect proxy because some people use search toolbars to type in the
name of a URL. These navigational searches are similar to typing in the name of the site in
the browser. Navigational searches, however, are likely to be positively correlated with
direct referrals since they both result from people remembering the name of the site to
enter. For example, in the case of Yelp, direct referrals are 5.83% of all visits, and
navigational searches are 10% of all search referrals; in the case of Angie’s List direct
referrals are 14.74% of all visits, and navigational searches are 72% of all search referrals.
Thus, Angie’s List has both a higher share of direct referrals, and a higher share of
navigational searches. Compete.com PRO Database, February 2012.
107
Formally, the sample consists of two strata – 15,000 observations from the top
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Table 3 reports summary statistics on these websites. We report total
search, which includes some paid search resulting from advertising, because
it is most comparable to other data we will report below on the Google
complainants. The mean share of non-paid search traffic was 22.7 percent.
Two-thirds of the websites (17th percentile through the 83rd percentile) have
search shares between 10.4 and 40.9 percent. It is interesting to observe
where Angie’s List and Yelp, the two web-based businesses discussed
earlier, fall in the distribution. Angie’s list is on the 52nd percentile of
search reliance (just above the median) while Yelp is on the 91st percentile
of search reliance.
Table 3 Distribution of Search Shares
Percentile
th

10
20th
30th
40th
50th
60th
70th
80th
90th
Median
Average

Non-Paid Search
5.41%
9.99%
13.64%
18.80%
22.65%
26.82%
31.17%
37.44%
44.80%
22.65%
25.06%

Total Search
6.91%
11.52%
16.27%
21.13%
25.20%
28.67%
33.29%
38.90%
47.89%
25.20%
27.41%

C. Search-Engine Litigation
A number of websites have filed complaints against Google in the
courts or before competition authorities alleging that the search engine
reduced their search rankings or ad placements and engaged in
15,000 websites and 15,000 observations from next one million websites. From this sample
of 30,000 websites, websites with missing data on the share of search traffic were
excluded, leaving 11,892 websites. Even those websites with missing search traffic data
included non-missing data on the total number of visits. This enables the estimation of the
probability of missing search data using a logit model with data on all 30,000 websites. To
appropriately weight the observations with non-missing search data, each observation
should be weighted by the inverse of its probability of inclusion in the sample. This can be
done, assuming that once the number of visits is controlled for, the probability of missing
data on search traffic is independent of the search traffic share. Under this assumption, if
the fitted probability of non-missing data (from the estimated logit model) for observation i
is pi, then the weight for observation i will be 1/pi if i was from the top 15,000 websites,
and (1/pi)*(1,0000,000/15,000) otherwise.
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anticompetitive conduct in doing so. This article focuses on the extent to
which these complaints come from businesses that have relied heavily on
search engines and the implications of this reliance. It does not address and
takes no position on the merits of these complaints.
One of the first businesses to sue Google was KinderStart. The
complaint, filed in federal court in the US by this “source of parenting and
fun learning information”,108 is typical of many of the others. Started in
May 2000, KinderStart’s business model involved attracting viewers to its
site and selling advertising to entities that want to reach those viewers. To
get viewers, it relied on search engines such as Google to list it in response
to inquiries by consumers for parental advice. KinderStart claims it had
“[s]teady, organic growth in visits and page views.”109 By early 2005, it had
more than 10 million page views, a common measure that is used in selling
web-based advertising.110
According to KinderStart, Google effectively blocked its site starting in
March 2005. As a result, KinderStart claimed that its traffic dropped by 70
percent, and its advertising revenue declined by 80 percent. It had used
Google’s AdSense program which paid affiliated websites a share of
revenue generated from ads that Google placed on the websites.
A year later, KinderStart sued Google on a number of grounds including
violating KinderStart’s right to free speech and for engaging in
anticompetitive and unfair business practices. KinderStart sought
certification of a nationwide class of similarly affected businesses whose
websites had been blocked or penalized by Google. This article focuses on
the claims that Google had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act.111
KinderStart made several notable observations in its complaint that
foreshadow future allegations against Google.
First, KinderStart claimed that search engines constitute a relevant
antitrust market and that Google had monopoly power in this market as
evidenced by having a share of more than 50 percent of that market.112
108

KinderStart – About Us, http://www.KinderStart.com/footerlinks.jsp?articleID=96
(last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
109
See Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 7, KinderStart.com, LLC v.
Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
110
See Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 7, KinderStart.com, LLC v.
Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). The complaint does not provide
a date for the peak but it is presumably before the decline in traffic starting in March 2005
which is the subject of the complaint.
111
The discussion below is based on KinderStart’s original and amended complaints
and the ruling by the court of Google’s successful motion to dismiss. The discussion
focuses mainly on the Sherman Section 2 claims regarding the search market. See id. at 5053.
112
Id. at 7, 50.
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Second, KinderStart claimed that its website “is a directory and search
engine that offers vital links to information and sites on key subjects
affecting young children, including child rearing, child care, child
development, food and nutrition, and education . . . .”113 It claimed that it
competed with Google in the search market. 114
Third, KinderStart characterized Google as “a common carrier that
makes a public offer to provide communications facilities for subscribers to
freely use its facilities to link to and connect with one or more Websites that
are hosted on the Internet.”115 It also asserted that any “[w]ebsite seeking to
gain visibility, site traffic and page views must rely upon Defendant
Google’s Google Engine as an essential facility for receiving search query
hits.”116
Fourth, KinderStart claimed that Google attained and maintained
monopoly power in the search engine market by reducing the search rank or
denying access to its search engine for listings of KinderStart and other
websites that competed in the search engine market.117
As it turns out, the court dismissed KinderStart’s complaints holding
that KinderStart failed to plead a relevant antitrust market and failed to
allege causal antitrust injury.118 The case is relevant because it is
prototypical of subsequent actions brought against Google and Baidu.
When a website experiences a reduction in its rank on Google search results
it has become common for websites to file a complaint which claims that
(1) online “search” is a relevant antitrust market, (2) Google has monopoly
power in that market, (3) Google’s search engine is an essential facility, (4)
the website also does search and therefore competes with Google in the
search market, and (5) Google reduced the search rank of the website to
maintain a monopoly or dominant position.
Table 4 summarizes the major complaints that have been filed against
Google in the US and EU. The majority relate to organic search, which
Google provides at no charge. In each case the Table identifies the type of
website, the main allegation, the venue of the case, and the website’s traffic
if it was still active. It also reports the percentage of traffic from search and
the percentile in the search-reliance distribution for each complainant. A
113

Class Action Complaint at 4, KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057
JF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (emphasis added).
114
Id. at 10.
115
First Amended Class Action Complaint at 10, KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google,
Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
116
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
117
Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 51, KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google,
Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
118
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 16, KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No.
C 06-2057 JF (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
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total of 21 complaints were identified. The number of complainants is
minute relative to the number of businesses that obtain free website
indexing and search from Google. There were about 662 million active
websites worldwide as of May 2012.Of the 21 complainants it was not
possible to obtain search data for three. Of the 18 complaints for which
search data were available, six were in the top 10 percentile of the
distribution of search reliance and 13 were in the top 40 percentile of the
distribution. The complaints against Google therefore come
disproportionately from firms that have very extreme search reliance: 33
percent of the complaints for which there was data (6 out of 18) were in the
top 10 percent of the distribution and 72 percent (13 out of 18) were in the
top 40 percent. These results, however, are based on data after the
complaints were filed in most of these cases. Since many of the complaints
claim reductions in search rankings it is likely that the search shares were
even higher before the complaint was filed.119

119

Judging by their complaints, KinderStart and TradeComet were even more
dependent on search than indicated here. KinderStart claimed that after Google reduced its
search ranking, its page views plummeted to 30% of previous levels (Second Amended
Complaint at ¶ 31), implying search dependence of greater than 70%. Similarly,
TradeComet claimed that after Google raised the minimum AdWords bids required from
TradeComet, traffic to its webpage dropped to 1% of its previous level (Complaint at ¶ 8),
implying search dependence of 99%.
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Table 4 Examples of Antitrust Complaints Against Google Search
Engine 120
Complainant

Service

Year

Allegation

Venue

Monthly
Unique
Visitors

Search King

Search

2002

US

KinderStart

Parenting
resources

2006

Demotion of
search
ranking
Demotion of
search
ranking

Christopher
Langdon
Carl Person

Blog

2006

Vertical
search

2006

Trade Comet

Business
directory

2009

myTriggers

Comparison
shopping

2010

Refusal to
place ads
Manipulation
of AdWords
auctions;
favoring
other sites
Manipulation
of AdWords
auctions;
favoring
other sites
Manipulation
of AdWords
auctions

120

1,447

Percent
of Visits
from
Search
33%

Search
Percentile
69th

US

807

52%

92nd*

US

Defunct

-

-

US

2,165

65%

97th

US

2,701

72%

97th

US

6,155

72%

97th

Traffic is visits from US-based browsers in January 2012 as reported by
Compete.com. For US websites, the search percentage is the percentage of visits from USbased browsers referred by search engines, taken from Compete.com if available, and from
Hitwise US otherwise. For EU websites, the search percentage is the percentage of visits
from browsers worldwide referred by search engines, taken from Alexa.com. Regardless of
the source of the search percentage data, the search percentile is found by comparing the
search percentage to the distribution of search percentages computed from Compete.com
data as described in the text. In cases where the complainant discussed multiple websites
for which data were available, the table shows a range of search percentages. Note that due
to differences in data sources, the search percentages reported here for KinderStart and
Trade Comet differ somewhat from the search percentages reported in the Complaints,
infra note 118. Also note that the search data reported here includes both paid search and
navigational organic search. For most of these websites, the split between the different
types of search is unavailable. As a consequence, the search percentages reported here are
overstated relative to non-navigational organic search. But since the percentile rankings
make the apples-to-apples comparison of total search percentage for these websites to the
overall distribution of total search, this problem is alleviated when looking at the rankings.
There may be some remaining difference if the ratio of non-navigational organic search to
total search is substantially different for the complainants than for the general sample of
websites. In our sample of websites, paid searches constitute only 9% of total searches on
average, and other studies have found that navigational searches are infrequent relative to
total searches (Brian J. Jansen, Danielle L. Booth & Amanda Spark, Determining the
Informational, Navigational, and Transactional Intent of Web Queries, 44(3) INFO.
PROCESSING & MANAGE. 1251 (2008), so this effect is likely to be small on average, and
there is no particular reason to expect it to work in either direction.
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D’Agostino

eCommerce

2010

Yelp

Local
reviews

2010

TripAdvisor

Travel

2010

Expedia

Travel

2010

Kayak

Travel

2010

Nextag

Comparison
shopping

2010

Ciao

Shopping
portal

2010

Foundem

Comparison
shopping

2010

1PlusV

Vertical
search

2010

Deal Du
Jour

Deals

2011

HotMaps

Online maps

2011

nntp.it

Newsgroups

2011

Elf Voetbal

Football
resources

2011

Interactive
Lab

Referral
services

2011

Mistaken
identification
as duplicate
site, resulting
in a reduction
in search
ranking
Favoring
Universal
Search;
excessive
utilization of
complainant’s
content
Favoring
Universal
Search
Favoring
Universal
Search
Favoring
Universal
Search
Favoring
Universal
Search
AdSense
exclusivity
and other
restrictions
Demotion of
search
ranking;
Favoring
Universal
Search
Removal of
webpages
from
Google’s
index;
Demotion of
search
ranking
Demotion of
search
ranking
Demotion of
search
ranking;
favoring
Universal
Search
Demotion of
search
ranking
Favoring
Google
OneBox
Manipulation
of AdWords
auctions
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US

Defunct

-

-

US

16,316,263

50%

91st

US/EU

13,802,658

31%

65th

US/EU

33,706,382

13%

23rd

US

6,569,610

17%

31st

US

18,176,620

34%

71st

EU

-

33-40%

69th – 82nd

EU

-

46%

88th

EU

-

56-73%

94th – 98th

EU

-

27%

53rd

EU

-

41%

83rd

EU

-

13%

23rd

EU

-

10%

16th

EU

-

-

-
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Twenga

Shopping
portal

2012

Favoring
Google’s
Universal
Search

EU

-

27-40%

56th – 82nd

V. THE IMPACT ON SOCIAL WELFARE OF THE ADVERSE SELECTION AND
LARGE NUMBERS PROBLEM
As noted earlier, multi-sided platforms are often economically
significant firms. They have the same temptations as any powerful firm
does to engage in harmful behavior. Competition authorities, for example,
should monitor these firms for all the same reasons they consider other
significant companies. The adverse selection and large number problems,
however, can generate numerous complaints from firms that have
experienced problems largely because of their own failings but have chosen
to exercise their litigation option opportunistically against the platform.
If courts and competition authorities had perfect information they could
simply identify which complaints have merit and which do not. In practice,
these decision makers do not have perfect information and therefore need to
determine how much effort they should expend looking into these
complaints. Even after investigation and adjudication they would not have
perfect information and could, on occasion, condemn pro-competitive
practices: what is known in error-cost analysis as a “false positive.”121
This section argues that if competition authorities and courts ignore the
adverse selection and large number problems, multi-sided platforms would
be subject to excessive litigation, and false positive decisions, which would
reduce social welfare. The next section then describes how competition
authorities and courts should adjust their decisions on allocating scarce
resources—and ultimately their screens for assessing anticompetitive
behavior—given these problems. In both cases, the analysis applies beyond
competition authorities to any consideration of government policy towards
multi-sided platforms based on complaints by users of free business
services.
A. Adverse Selection, Large Numbers, and False Positives

121

This is also known as a Type II error. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing
Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 72, 73 (2005); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed.
2010).
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Most antitrust cases arise from complaints by firms. In the US, most
antitrust litigation results from private lawsuits; firms bring most of these
lawsuits with the exception of class action price-fixing cases involving
consumer goods.122 In most jurisdictions, competition authorities pursue
cases as a result of complaints brought by firms. In the European Union the
European Commission receives complaints and must make specific
decisions on whether or not to pursue those complaints.123 In the United
States, although the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
do not have any obligation to pursue complaints, many of the
monopolization cases they do pursue arise from complaints by businesses.
The previous sections have shown that several factors can result in
competition authorities receiving large numbers of complaints concerning
multi-sided platforms. Firms can fashion complaints that articulate a
superficially plausible antitrust claim. Changes in platform rules can harm
some of the business users of free platform services. A portion of those
users may exercise their litigation option and file a complaint in court or
before a competition authority. Although the likelihood that any particular
user of free platform services files a complaint may be very low, because of
the large numbers involved for some platforms, the cumulative likelihood
that at least one complaint arises can be very high. In fact, as shown earlier,
when a platform serves millions of businesses, a very small probability that
a business will sue can result in hundreds of complaints and the virtual
certainty of someone complaining.
These complaints are likely to come disproportionately from businesses
that had relatively low a priori odds of success and relied on free platform
services relatively more because of liquidity constraints. When a platform
makes a change that harms some users the ones who use it the most are
likely to be harmed the most. The businesses that are overly reliant on the
platform are also likely to be more vulnerable businesses and therefore
more likely to be pushed over the edge, into failure, as a result of the
changes. The litigation option may be their only asset.
In the US and other jurisdictions that allow private plaintiffs to recover
treble damages businesses tend to have higher valued litigation options all
else equal if they have been adversely affected by the platform change and
rely heavily on the platform. In other jurisdictions these businesses may be
122

In the 12-month period ending March 31, 2011, private antitrust actions accounted
for 537 out of the 555 antitrust cases filed in the federal courts (97%). Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2011, Table C-2,
available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloa
dStatistics/2011/tables/C02Mar11.pdf
123
Council Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission
under articles 81 and 82 of the EC treaty O.J. (C 101) 65-77.
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able to secure concessions from the platform as a condition of not filing a
complaint or withdrawing a complaint that has been filed.
The argument is not that cases brought against platforms necessarily
lack merit. However, large multi-sided platforms that provide free services
are likely to be subject to many complaints from firms that have failed as a
result of their own low quality combined with decisions to rely mainly on
the provision of free platform services. These firms are opportunistically
using their litigation option to obtain compensation for problems they have,
in effect, caused themselves. As noted, if courts and competition authorities
had perfect information they could simply screen these cases out.
Information is imperfect, however, and it only takes one complaint to
lead to a negative and possibly catastrophic outcome for the platform. Here
is where the large number problem raises the stakes for multi-sided
platforms. To see why, suppose there is a 99 percent probability that the
court or competition authority will reject a complaint that lacks merit and a
1 percent probability that it will rule in a complainants’ favor, even though
its complaint lacks merit. Consider a platform that has 1 million business
users. The platform could expect to face 100 complaints if there were a
.01% (i.e., 1/10,000) probability of a business user filing a complaint.
Assuming the decisions on complaints are independent, one would expect
that these 100 complaints would lead to one false positive.
While one could debate the specifics of this calculation, in both
directions, the point is that as the number of business users increases, the
probability of false positives increases. For platforms with millions of
users each year, the probability of a false positive, over the duration of
putative dominance, could approach certainty under plausible assumptions.
If antitrust lawsuits were simply about paying damages this result would
not be of much concern. It would just be a cost of doing business for the
platform. The problem is that a decision by a competition authority or court
can apply to other business users of the platform in similar circumstances.
That can result from either behavioral remedies124 or a decision by the
platform to change certain behavior to avoid costly litigation and damages
in the future.125

124

For example, Microsoft was required to make certain information available to firms
to facilitate their interoperating with Microsoft’s Windows server operating system and to
distribute a version of Windows that did not include certain media playing functionality.
See Case T‑201/04 R, Microsoft v. Comm’n, [2004] E.C.R. II‑4463.
125
See Claudine Beaumont, Microsoft and EU reach browser settlement, TELEGRAPH
(Dec. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/microsoft/6825561/Microsoft-and-EU-reachbrowser-settlement.html.
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B. False Positives and Negative Externalities
When a false positive arises, by assumption, the multi-sided platform
has not engaged in anticompetitive behavior. In this case one can infer that
the platform has adopted business practices, including decisions involving
managing positive and negative externalities and balancing the sometimes
competing interests of platform members, to maximize profits.126 Economic
theory finds that, although the balance struck by multi-sided platforms may
not exactly equal the socially optimal balance, the direction and magnitude
of the bias (if any) will depend in a complicated way on a host of hard-tomeasure factors (such as marginal costs on all sides, demand elasticities on
all sides, and the intensity of competition for end-users on all sides) and that
there is no reason to believe that multi-sided platforms in general exhibit a
substantial bias towards a particular side.127 Some authors have identified
specific exceptions, such as with payment cards, where under some
assumptions the profit-maximizing platform operator may tilt prices more
towards one side more than a social welfare-maximizing platform operator
would.128 But even in this case there is no reason to believe that decisions,
for example, on which side should bear relatively more of the costs of
platform are socially suboptimal—only the degree of the tilt towards one
side or the other.
Platforms are likely to alter the balances they strike between different
parts of the community when courts or competition authorities reach a false
positive decision. In this case the court or competition authority would have
reached a conclusion that a business practice involving one side of a multisided platform is unlawful. The platform would suspend the practice either
as part of a behavioral remedy or to avoid future penalties.
Suppose, for example, Google were compelled to change its practices
for ranking websites, or for punishing websites that violate its practices.
Some websites would necessarily do better in the rankings but others would
126

See generally Rochet & Tirole, supra note 34; Weyl, supra note 14. For a platform
with market power there are two possible sources of welfare loss. One is the usual welfare
loss resulting from the exercise of market power, which results in the elevation of overall
prices. The other is a possible welfare loss which results in tilting the price structure in
such as way that one side is bearing more, and another side, less of the cost of operating the
platform that a social welfare maximizing regulator would.
127
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 34.
128
See Bedre-Defolie & Calvano, supra note 37, at 5-6. Calvano observes, however,
that even under these assumptions the privately and socially optimal prices are unlikely to
differ dramatically. See Emilio Calvano, Note on the Economic Theory of Interchange,
Comment on the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Regulation II (2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/March/20110328/R-1404/R1404_030811_69122_621890579792_1.pdf.
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do worse and would therefore lose. In addition, to the extent that Google’s
ranking decisions were correct to begin with, consumers would get lower
quality search results. If consumers reduced their use of search because of
this reduction in quality then advertisers would have less ability to reach
these consumers.129
False positive decisions cause negative externalities and thereby reduce
social welfare. Platforms seek to maximize the value of the platform to the
members after taking into account positive and negative externalities
between these members. When one of these decisions is reversed it is likely
that the platform will either create fewer positive externalities or more
negative externalities. That could result directly from reversing rules that
generate positive externalities among members by, for example, making it
easier for them to get together and interact or that suppress negative
externalities by, for example, discouraging members from disseminating
bad information. That could also result indirectly from changing pricing
decisions or rules that reduce platform participation by some members. For
example, suppose the platform is required to increase prices to a group of
platform participants. The platform would have chosen prices given the
positive externalities between members to maximize the value of the
platform. By raising prices to one group, the platform would reduce their
participation, and by reversing positive feedback effects, would reduce the
value of the platform to other groups.
C. The Impact of False Positives on Platform Decisions, Design and
Innovation
A false positive decision can have spillovers from the narrow matter that
was under consideration for that decision. It can set a precedent that the
platform must abide by in other related decisions. A decision concerning
platform practices or rules concerning the use of free services by businesses
can directly affect those practices or rules. A decision may enjoin a
particular type of practice. A decision can also lead the platform to modify
other practices or rules that seem like they would be subject to similar
complaints and thus similar adverse decisions. A false positive decision can
also set a precedent that raises the likelihood that similar practices and rules
adopted by other platform companies will be subject to adverse decisions.
129

Gord Hotchkiss, Why Results Quality is So Important to Search Engines, SEARCH
ENGINE LAND (May 20, 2011), http://searchengineland.com/why-results-quality-is-soimportant-to-search-engines-77957; In Search of the Perfect Search: Can Google Beat
Attempts to Game the System?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2731.

Excessive Litigation and Free Internet Platform Services

49

Other platforms will therefore alter those practices and rules in anticipation
of costly litigation and negative rulings.
The primary cost of false positive decisions arising from the adverse
selection and large number problems, however, involves distortions in
decisions that platforms, and their entrepreneurs, make prospectively
concerning the adoption of business models, the direction of innovation,
and governance rules. The thesis of this Article is that these problems result
in a high probability, if not a certainty, that large, global multi-sided
platforms will face false positive decisions concerning the business users of
the platform. That expectation could lead platforms to increase the price to
business users to compensate for the risks and incremental costs they will
bear; to avoid innovations that could harm some business users; and to
vertically integrate into applications rather than relying on an open
platform. At the margin the likelihood of false positive decisions—i.e.,
adverse decisions over pro-competitive business practices—reduces the
incentives to start platforms or to consider platform models that involve
providing services for free to businesses.
Any reduction in the supply of free business services by multi-sided
platforms could have knock-on effects on innovation. An open platform
model in which the entrepreneurs are encouraged to develop applications
and other complementary products decentralizes innovation. It moves the
control of the direction and pace of innovation from the platform owner to a
large population of entrepreneurs.130 This fact is seen from the success that
several of the global multi-sided platforms have had as shown in Table 1. It
is hard to imagine a centralized firm accomplishing so much innovation in
such as short space of time.
D. Impact on Competition Authority Resource Allocation
The large number and adverse selection problems could result in a
further inefficiency. Uncorrected, these problems could lead antitrust
authorities into misallocating their resources and investigating multi-sided
platforms more than other industries that have the same or higher
likelihoods of having engaged in wrongdoing. Given that competition
authorities have scarce resources the failure to adjust decisions to pursue
cases given these phenomena would result in underinvestment in pursuing
other complaints.
To see the essence of the problem consider a competition authority that
130

Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Challenges of open innovation: the paradox of firm
investment in open-source software, 33 R&D MANAGE. 319, 320 (2006); Georg von
Krogh et al., Community, joining, and specialization in open source software innovation: a
case study, 32 RESEARCH POL’Y 236, 237 (2003).
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has to evaluate whether to invest resources on the investigation of various
companies. Company A is a global multi-sided platform that provides free
business services and Companies B and C are not multi-sided platforms. All
three firms have the same revenue and market value. The authority has 20
complaints against company A, only one against company B, and none
against company C. All else equal the authority might conclude that the
agency should focus on company A because of the volume of complaints.
But company A could be subject to many complaints as a result of the large
number and adverse selection problems. There is no a reason, a priori, to
believe that company A is more likely to have engaged in anticompetitive
behavior than companies B or C.

VI. HEIGHTENED ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF COMPLAINTS BY BUSINESS
USERS OF FREE MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM SERVICES
This Article proposes that courts and competition authorities should
impose a higher level of scrutiny on complaints brought by business users
of free multi-sided platform services. Before describing what this means in
practice it is helpful to emphasize that the proposal itself is modest. There
is no suggestion that antitrust decision makers should ignore possible
antitrust violations by multi-sided platforms much less give them a free
pass. Some of these platforms are economically significant and
anticompetitive actions by them could impose serious harm. Nor does this
article suggest that competition authorities or courts should presume that
platform business practices concerning business users of free platform
services are pro-competitive.
However, this Article has shown that the litigation option, adverse
selection and large number phenomena are likely to lead to false positive
decisions against multi-sided platform providers of free business services
and that those false positives, and the anticipation of them, reduce social
welfare. The reduction in social welfare could be significant since it could
lead to an increase of negative externalities on large multi-sided platforms
that are subject to an adverse decision and because it could have follow-on
effects on innovation and decisions at other, including formative, multisided platforms.
A. How Decision Makers Should Adjust Their Assessments
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The first part of the proposal is that courts and competition authorities
should consider the litigation option, adverse selection, and large number
phenomena in forming judgments concerning the weight that a particular
complaint by a business user of free plaintiff services should be given.131
Courts and competition authorities ultimately need to make judgments on
whether or not to pursue a complaint. In the US courts have to decide
motions to dismiss a complaint and motions for summary judgment.132
Competition authorities in all jurisdictions need to decide how to allocate
resources across different industries. They must also chose which
complaints to pursue and how aggressively. Whether they acknowledge it
or not these decisions are based in part on judgments concerning the weight
to be accorded to various kinds of evidence and, ultimately, the likelihood
that further consideration will uncover anticompetitive behavior.
Any particular complaint against a multi-sided platform that provides
free services may result from a low-quality business that has failed largely
through its own shortcomings, opportunistically exercising their litigation
option. That probability increases with the number of businesses that use
free platform services. Moreover, competition authorities and courts should
discount multiple complaints, at a point in time or over time, against a
multi-sided platform provider of free business services according to the
number of business users served by a platform. It would be wrong to infer
that multiple complaints necessarily suggest a pattern of anticompetitive
behavior or signal a serious problem, given the very larger number of
entities that interact with the platform.
B. Heightened Scrutiny of Complaints
The analysis set forth indicates that courts and competition authorities
could reduce the likelihood of reaching a false positive decision by taking
the following factors into account in assessing a complaint:
•

131

The extent to which the harm alleged by the complainant is the
result of business practices engaged in by the platform versus the
failings of the complainant itself. For this purpose it is useful for
the decision maker to examine the quality of the business
including the entrepreneur, the management team, the business
model, business execution, and financial backing.

D.H. Kaye, Burdens of Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision Rules Do and Do Not
Do 3 INT. J. EVID. PROOF 1 (1999).
132
Such motions are decided according to the tests set out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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•

The number of business users of free platform services. With a
large number there is a higher probability that the particular
complaint is an aberration, due the peculiarities of the business
in question, and not evidence of anticompetitive behavior.

•

The impact of enjoining the behavior on other platform users.
That should consist of other business users as well as other sides
of the business. A change in business practices that benefits
particular types of business users but harms other business users
and other platform users would likely decrease social welfare.

•

Whether the decisions regarding the complainant follow a
governance system for reducing negative externalities. In this
case there is a strong presumption that the decision is procompetitive and the burden should be placed on the complainant
to show that it is not.133

These factors could be taken into consideration at any stage of the
analysis. For competition authorities these factors would be taken into
account at the point of deciding whether to devote resources to a complaint,
whether to move a complaint into a fully fledged investigation, whether to
pursue a complaint, what issues to focus on, and which behavioral remedies
to advocate. For US courts these factors would be considered during
procedural phases (motion to dismiss and summary judgment) as well as
during consideration of the merits of the case and remedies.
C. Application to Search Litigation
In the case of the Google search litigation this analysis indicates that the
courts or competition authorities should take several factors into account in
considering complaints.
The relative number of complainants. Google has provided free listing
and search services to millions of business websites for more than a decade.
The number of complainants relative to the population of businesses that
have obtained similar free services from it is extremely low. It also appears
that some of these businesses have pursued complaints against Google in
part because they have received help from one of Google’s competitors.134
133

See Evans, supra note 41.
Microsoft Encourages Google Antitrust Complaints, Utility Exchange (Mar. 1
2010),http://www.utility-exchange.co.uk/microsoft-encourages-google-antitrustcomplaints-5445/.
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In effect, a platform competitor has in effect purchased the “litigation
options” of these businesses to impose costs.
Search dependency. It appears that most of the companies that have
filed complaints against Google (in contrast to other sites) are highly search
dependent. About a third of the complainants had developed businesses
that relied almost entirely on search for traffic to their websites. That is
consistent with these businesses having decided that, given their abilities
and their ideas, it was not worth investing in branding that would attract
direct traffic.
Adverse selection. Many of the complaints concern reductions in search
rankings. These have mainly come from web sites pursuing business models
offered by many similar sites. These firms would not have had a high
likelihood of success—since such “me-too” sites do not generally—
regardless of changes in their search rankings. In addition to relying
excessively on search these businesses perhaps ran into difficulties for the
same reason that other business do that fail to distinguish themselves.
Alleged harm results from governance system. Most of the
complainants claim that they were harmed as a result of Google either
reducing their search ranking as a punishment or as a result of Google
changing its algorithms. Having a governance system that counters the
incentives of websites to engage in self-serving manipulation of their
rankings is economically efficient. As noted earlier complainants should
bear a heavy burden in challenging practices that result from the application
of a platform governance system. In particular, a complaining party should
be required to certify that the information provided to the agency is, to their
knowledge, accurate. The agencies should also establish a mechanism for
sanctioning third parties that mislead the agencies into imposing costs on
other parties.135
Negative externalities. As a general matter it is economically efficient
for search engine platforms to penalize websites that artificially inflate their
rankings and to modify their algorithms to reduce the ability of websites to
game the system. Moreover, it is impossible in the real world to design
governance systems that have zero false positives—just as it is impossible
135

Although the agencies have tools to punish particularly egregious conduct, these
additional measures would provide additional protections that both conserve agency
resources and protect targets and third parties from opportunistic abuses. If a party is
dissuaded from submitting a complaint because of the requirement to swear as to its
veracity, the agencies likely are better off not having received it.
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to design a legal system to have zero false positives. Action by a court or
competition authority that would discourage the use of these economically
efficient methods would impose negative externalities on the other platform
participants including websites (some of whom would have lower rankings
in the absence of methods to deter opportunistic efforts to increase
rankings) and search users (who will obtain less relevant search results).
This Article does not argue that these factors by themselves should lead
to the dismissal of complaints against Google or other search engines in
similar situations. Rather, the point is that courts and competition
authorities should consider these factors in their decision making.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
In the last two decades one of the most remarkable developments in the
history of business has occurred. Multi-sided platforms, operating globally,
have developed Internet-based software that enables businesses to access
hundreds of millions of consumers who also use these platforms for
services. These platforms not only provide this access for free, in many
cases, but also provide other assistance to help these businesses. Millions
of businesses use free services provided by firms such as Facebook and
Google. In some cases these multi-sided platforms provide extensive
software assistance that enables entrepreneurs to develop businesses based
on applications that work with these platforms. Hundreds of thousands of
applications have been created by software platforms that run on personal
computers, mobile devices, or in the cloud.
By providing free services multi-sided platforms stimulate a great deal
of effort by entrepreneurs. But they also tend to attract firms that cannot
secure funding or that do not want to invest because of the risk. Many of
these entrepreneurs who rely on free platform services may be highly
capable. But there are reasons to believe that platform that provide free
business services attract entrepreneurs that want to rely on free services
because the entrepreneurs and potential investors do not have enough
confidence to risk losing their capital investments. As a result when the
platform makes changes that adversely affect some business users these low
quality firms are the ones most likely to complain. In some cases changes
made by the platform push them into bankruptcy or would if they could not
get a reprieve. The only asset they have left is a litigation option.
The fact that multi-sided platforms serve very large numbers of business
users raises a further problem. These large numbers increase the likelihood

Excessive Litigation and Free Internet Platform Services

55

that changes made by a platform will cause some business to file a lawsuit.
It takes only a miniscule propensity to sue to generate a complaint—indeed
many complaints—given the large numbers of businesses served.
Furthermore, when applied to a very large number of businesses the adverse
selection of entrepreneurs into reliance on free business services results in a
significant number of complaints coming from relatively poor businesses
that are exercising their litigation option.
Competition authorities and courts should take the litigation option,
adverse selection and large number phenomena into account in evaluating
complaints. Otherwise global multi-sided platforms will be swamped with
litigation in multiple jurisdictions around the world. Unless courts and
competition authorities make adjustments in their decision making, these
platforms would be virtually guaranteed that they would be subject to a
false positive decision at some point. These false positive decisions would
result directly in the reduction in social welfare created by the targeted
multi-sided platforms, which would have to rebalance business practices in
ways that would necessarily harm some non-complaining users. They
would also tend to discourage multi-sided platforms from operating open
platforms that provide free services to business users and discourage multisided platforms from engaging in legitimate balancing decisions.

